Search for romance or Holy war?

A discourse analysis of Swedish counter radicalisation and its gendering
of females in violent jihadi organisations

Märtha Louise Margaretha Gellin

140020401

University of
St Andrews

I hereby certify that this dissertation, which is approximately 13.660 words in length, has been composed by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. This project was conducted by me at the University of St Andrews from June 2015 to August 2015 towards fulfilment of the requirements of the University of St Andrews for the degree of M.Litt, under the supervision of Prof. John Anderson.

Date of submission: 31 August 2015   Signature of candidate ....

Table of Contents

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to show that Swedish counter radicalisation has maintained traditional gender norms, and thus undermined the potential threat that women who engage in violent jihadi organisations might pose. This will be demonstrated through a discourse analysis with a feminist perspective of Swedish counter radicalisation. I will further argue that the gendering, in itself, is a security threat towards Sweden's security.

Saltman and Smith (2015) have concluded that the push- and pull factors for women who have recently joined ISIS do not differ from the factors which lead to radicalisation for men who engage in violent jihadi organisations. However, media and official documents tend to claim that women who join are radicalised through the influence of a man, and therefore sometimes not even held responsible for their actions. All in line with Gentry and Sjoberg's (2007 &2015) theories of gendering women in political violence.

This dissertation will present the process of radicalisation, a historical background of violent jihadi organisations, with the main focus on Europe, to later move on to the discourse analysis with Sweden as a case study. Sweden has seen a non neglectable amount of fighters who have recently travelled to Syria, many of whom are women. Even so, the women are undermined as a threat as females are gendered throughout Swedish counter radicalisation and Swedish media.

Key words: *Radicalisation, Counter radicalisation, Sweden, Gendering, Political violence, Political Islam, Jihad, ISIS.*

Introduction

"Their activities are problematic but based on our mission, which is to prevent terrorist crimes in Sweden, we do not follow up [on them]."[1] Those were the words of Anders Kassman, operative manager of the Swedish Security Police, regarding Swedish women who join violent jihadi organisations abroad. (Örwall Lovén 2014) This is merely one example of the gendering of female violent extremism and how authorities undermine the threat women in violent jihadi organisations might pose.

Since the Islamic State[2] declared a Caliphate in 2014, Europeans traveling to join jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria have gained substantial media attention, even though the phenomenon of foreign fighters traveling to the Middle East and North Africa to pursue jihad is not a new one. However, more women than previously are leaving their life in Europe to be a part of the new Caliphate. In the media, these women are more often than men portrayed as victims, stuck in the terror of ISIS. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that they most often travel voluntarily and are also radicalised to support their violent means[3], why they can also pose a threat.

Gentry and Sjoberg (2007 & 2015) have concluded that women in political violence are often portrayed as unaccountable for their actions, and are often claimed to act under the

---

[1] My translation. Original text: "Deras aktiviteter är problematiska men utifrån vårt uppdrag, vilket är att hindra terrorbrott i Sverige, så gör vi ingen uppföljning."

[2] Throughout this dissertation I will refer to the organisation active in Syria and Iraq as either the Islamic State or ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). Some refer to them as "Daesh", however, this name will not be used in this dissertation.

[3] This will be presented further below with references to Hoyle et al (2015) and Saltman & Smith (2015).

influence of a man. I will argue that the same is true for Swedish women who join violent jihadi organisations. Their radicalisation process is either dismissed as a *"search for romance"* or it is assumed that they were tricked into joining such organisations. Even though, as Bekker and de Leede (2015:5) points out, motivations for young women do not differ from those of young men. Further research on the subject has been conducted by Saltman and Smith (2015) who reached the same conclusion. Their result is presented in push and pull factors, which will serve as a useful framework for this analysis.

The aim of this dissertation is to show that Swedish counter radicalisation has in fact maintained traditional gender norms, as the above quotation is one example of. The gendering of ISIS sympathisers, and the fact that the threat from female foreign fighters is undermined is in itself a security threat towards Sweden. To avoid this, I will present a recommendation for further gender awareness in Swedish counter radicalisation. Previous research has shown that women join violent jihadi organisations for the same reasons as men, and even though we cannot say for sure that they conduct violent acts abroad – there is evidence that women support violence and that they play an important role in the territory controlled by ISIS. By ignoring the threat a female sympathiser might pose, the Swedish Security Police and others involved in counter radicalisation might fail to prevent women from joining violent jihadi organisations and a potential domestic attack in the future.

Methodology

This section presents the methodology, material and definitions that have been used throughout this dissertation. In the following section a review of previous research and theories is presented before the specific case study of Sweden.

I will investigate the gendering of female jihadi-sympathisers in Swedish counter radicalisation by conducting a discourse analysis. I have chosen to focus on Sweden because, in relation to its size, many Swede's have travelled to join violent jihadi groups in Syria recently. (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2015-01-29) Scandinavia has also been high in rank on gender equality and gender awareness. (World Economic Forum 2014) Thus, if there is gendering in the Swedish contexts it can be assumed that the same is true for other European countries.

In conducting a discourse analysis, language is of great importance. However, most of my primary sources will be in Swedish and will be translated by myself. I realise it may be problematic for the reader, since they cannot critically review the original texts used in the analysis. I argue that my translations are objective and literal, and thus this should not be a problem. To show the literality in my translations, I have chosen to present the original texts in Swedish in footnotes where I have conducted the translation, so the reader who is comfortable with Swedish may review my translations.

The discourse analysis I will execute to investigate the gendering in counter radicalisation will have a constructivist, feminist approach. My definition of gender is in line with the school of constructivism, meaning that gender is socially constructed and thus it can change. By applying a feminist approach to the material, I will investigate whether the traditional gender norms are being maintained or questioned.

Feminist approaches seek to understand and deconstruct the traditional gender hierarchy and gender norms. (Sjoberg 2013:46) Since gender is socially constructed it can also change and vary for individuals within the same prescribed gender group. Thus, by examining the Swedish counter radicalisation in the case of violent jihadi organisation from a feminist perspective we can see that the traditional gender norms have in fact been maintained by authorities, and women's ability to conduct violence have been undermined. This lack of gender awareness is, in itself, a security threat because it neglects a potential threat, and it can lead to less effective counter radicalisation.

Material

The first part of this dissertation will deal with previous research, theory and a brief historical overview. A selection of the secondary sources used for this part will be presented alongside the primary sources used in the analysis. Given that, women who travel abroad from Sweden to join violent jihadi organisations is a relatively new occurrence, most empirical examples will be from women who have recently travelled to ISIS-controlled territory from Sweden, but also from other European countries. This being such a current phenomenon has made it problematic to find empirical sources, something that will be discussed throughout the dissertation.

Gentry and Sjoberg (2007 & 2015) have been my main inspiration for the gendering analysis. In their works "Mothers, Monsters and Whores" (2007) and "Beyond Mothers, Monsters and Whores" (2015) they argue that women in political violence have been undermined, and their motives have been diminished as irrational and emotional. Both Gentry and Sjoberg have written a lot of work on the subject of women in political

violence before[4] and they are experience in the area. Like they have looked at active women before, and come to the conclusion that they are subject of gendering, so will I look at the specific case of Swedish counter radicalisation aimed at violent jihadi organisations.

Regarding radicalisation theory, I have looked at several different sources, for example Ranstorp (2010). Ranstorp is active at The Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS) at the Swedish Defense University, and he is one of the most well-known scholars regarding the matter of violent jihadi organization in the Swedish context. So is Hans Brun, now active at Kings College in London, who is often speaking on the matter in Swedish media, and will be cited in this analysis. Among other things, I will discuss the reasons for radicalisation in the form of push and pull factors, which is also the framework that Saltman and Smith (2015) uses in their analysis of European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory. Another framework for the radicalisation process is the one developed by the Swedish Security Police, with four different pathways to radicalisation. They will be presented with references to the Security Police.

Regarding the background to jihadi movements I will mainly be referring to Esposito (2002). This source is considered reliable due to Esposito's extended work on the history of Islam as well as political Islam. Regarding the background on foreign fighters from Europe, Ranstorp (ed. 2010) has also been consulted, as well as Sandelin (2007 & 2012), a Swedish journalist who has worked on the matter for a long time.

---

[4] See for example: "Women, Gender and Terrorism" (2011), and "Reduced to bad sex: Narratives of violent women from the Bible to the War on Terror" (2008).

European females who travel abroad to join violent jihadi organisations are a fairly new phenomenon thus there is not much research on the matter. However, two reports on the subject, Saltman and Smith (2015) and Hoyle et al (2015) that were released during the spring of 2015 will be used as sources to describe the radicalisation process for women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory in this dissertation. Saltman and Smith (2015) have used the framework of push and pull factors to describe the reasons for radicalisation, which will serve as a suitable framework for my analysis. Both Saltman and Smith and Hoyle et al's results have been based on posts in social media from women who have travelled to join ISIS.[5] These social media updates will be brought up for discussion in the empirical background.

The material used for the analysis is primarily official documents concerning counter radicalisation. Due to the nature of the concept, several agents constitute what can be considered as the Swedish counter radicalisation. By Swedish counter radicalisation I therefore will refer to a broad understanding of the concept that incorporates the whole spectrum of responsible agents. Accordingly, the discourse analysis examines the executives, the Security Police[6] and social workers on the ground, the legislators, the government, and the experts, the Defence University as well as the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism. I have chosen to exclude material from the parliament work, because these are not prepared official documents, but mere discussions. Instead I will

---

[5] A majority of these posts have been taken down from social media, thus they are not available anymore. However, the ISD – where they conducted the report – have saved all of these in a database. I tried to get in contact with the ISD in order to get access to that database, without success. Thus, I have not been able to investigate Saltman and Smith, and Hoyle et al's primary sources.

[6] Please note the material is merely official documents, and thus I have not been able to research the Security Police's counter radicalisation work in praxis, only the part of their work that is shared in official documents.

look at government reports that have been thoroughly reviewed, where the authors have had the time to look through the language from a gender perspective, and if necessary changed its language. I argue there is greater relevance to find gendering in these more carefully concluded documents.

In Sweden, the counter radicalisation work has been conducted on a local level. However, in 2014, the Government (the Department of Law) decided to institute a National Coordination for the work against violent extremism that poses a threat towards democracy (Justitiedepartementet 2014) based on the recommendation of a government report from 2013 (SOU 2013). Their main task includes coordination of the actions taken by municipalities as well as different social institutions, police and researchers. The National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism's website also provide educational material. This material is meant to be supportive for the local actors working against radicalisation and extremism in Sweden and this material will also be taken into account in my discourse analysis.

The National Coordinator works closely with local actors as well as national actors who have good insight in counter radicalisation. One of those national actors is the Defence University in Stockholm. From the Defence University, Ranstorp et al (2015) released a report on counter radicalisation the summer of 2015. The report, which mainly covers violent jihadist organisations, will also be analysed. To complement government reports, the National Coordinator's material as well as Ranstorp et al (2015), written media material from Swedish media will be used. One example is the quotation in the start of

the introduction.[7] The articles that will be mentioned are relevant for the research because it has been proven hard to find other relevant material, especially from the Swedish Security Police.[8]

Definitions

To be able to follow the research below it is of high importance that all definitions of the primary terms used are clear. Therefore a discussion on the definitions of the terms gender, radicalisation and jihadist will be presented below.

Gender

The term gender as well as gendering will be consistently used throughout this dissertation. Gender can easily be described as the "social sex". While sex is referring to the biological differences between men and women, gender refers to the social differences between masculine and feminine. These are the two traditional gender categories that have been socially constructed and are by that means socially accepted in Western society today, and it is also the two I will be referring to in this dissertation. Even though gender is socially constructed, it is not less real, as Gentry and Sjoberg (2007:6) points out. It is, however, constantly evolving. Traditionally men and masculinity have been described as strong and rational, women and femininity have been described as weak, irrational and sometimes irresponsible for their own actions.

---

[7] Anders Kassman, operative manager of the Security Police: "Their activities are problematic but based on our mission, which is to prevent terrorist crimes in Sweden, we do not follow up [on them]." (Örwall Lovén 2014)

[8] The Security Police have been contacted through email (2015-07) and been asked for more material. Unfortunately they have not been able to provide it.

Gender is prescribed, not only to individuals, but also to other actors such as states and organisation and the process of prescribing these traditional attributes is gendering. (Sjoberg 2013:46) However, this study will merely look at the gendering of female individuals who are active in violent jihadi organisation.

Radicalisation

There is no widely accepted definition of the term radicalisation. Some definitions focus solely on the use of violence to reach political or ideological goals, while other definitions include the acceptance of violence but not necessarily to conduct violent acts. (Küle & Lindekilde 2010:22) This can be described as two degrees of radicalisation. That is, some radicalise to the degree that they use violence to obtain their objectives while others radicalise to support the use of violence, but do not resort to violence themselves. The Swedish Security Police (2010) have chosen to mainly focus on the former, because they argue that is the radicalised individuals that constitute a threat towards Sweden´s security. However, all terrorist organisations are highly dependent on support from the public in order to survive, thus the latter group is also relevant. The radicalised individuals that are not active are also a threat, because the terrorist organisations are dependent on their support.

In contrast to the Swedish Security Police, the European Commission uses a definition of radicalisation that do not solely speak of radicalisation that leads to the use of violence, but also to the acceptance and support of violence. The European Commission defines radicalisation as "*the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas, which could lead to acts of terrorism.*" (European Commission 2005:2) Thus, one person does not have to support violence to be radicalised. The definition provided by the European Commission is the one I will apply when speaking of radicalisation below, because it

includes all sorts of radicalisation. Thus, when the Swedish Security Police undermine women as a threat towards security, they do not take into account that by supporting violence they are also a threat. By using the European Commission's definition of radicalisation, I argue it to be easier to understand that all sort of radicalisation is in fact a security threat.

Jihadist

Throughout this dissertation I have chosen to refer to violent jihadi groups instead of, for example Islamism or Political Islam. Jihad is a controversial, and often misunderstood term, why I will present its definition further below. The reason why I have chosen to refer to their activism as jihad is to emphasis that their activities are not necessarily in line with the Islamic traditions. However complex the term is, I argue it to be the most valid term to use when talking about activists in ISIS and Al Qaeda.

The literal meaning of jihad is struggle, and it has always been an important part of the Islamic tradition. Its importance is rooted in the command to struggle in the Quran, and with examples from the life of the prophet Muhammad. However, as Esposito points out "*Jihad is a concept with multiple meanings, used and abused throughout Islamic history*". (Esposito 2002:27)

There are two main kinds of jihad: greater jihad, which can be described as internal jihad, and lesser jihad, which can be described as external jihad. This contrast is rooted in a well-known prophetic tradition. According to the legend, as Muhammad returned from the battle he said "*We return from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad*." The greater jihad, being the internal jihad, is the struggle against one's selfishness, and evil and it is described as more difficult than the lesser jihad. The meaning of jihad is thus the struggle

for living a good life, and depending on the circumstances that can be external: to fight injustice, oppression and defending Islam, sometimes through violent means. (Esposito 2002:28) In this dissertation we will look at lesser jihad, that is the external jihad to defend Islam, and we will only focus on those using violent means. Even though the term is very complex, this is the one meaning of the term that will be referred to in this paper, but it is important for the reader to recognise that the term may be used to describe something else in other contexts.

When speaking of organisations that use violence in the name of Islam, the term violent jihadi organisations will be used. Usually when speaking of extremism in Sweden, the word violence-prone is used to describe these groups. Thus, when referring to violent jihadi organisation, the term violent is used to pinpoint that these are violence-prone organisations that are conducting violent acts in order to gain their means.

Outline

In the next section I will further investigate the feminist approach, gendering and radicalisation theory. Once this is presented, we will consider specific cases of violent jihadi organisations and sympathisers in Europe, including Sweden, and females who have recently joined violent jihadi movements abroad. I will specifically look at Saltman and Smith's previous research on the radicalisation process for European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territories. Thereafter follows the discourse analysis of the Swedish counter radicalisation and the language used to describe women who are radicalised, in the specific case of militant jihadist organisations. Lastly, the conclusion will sum up the dissertation and its results, including policy recommendations for greater gender awareness in the use of language when speaking of female sympathisers in order not to miss potential future threats.

Radicalisation and femininity

This section will provide a theoretical background before moving on to the empirical case of Swedish women who join violent jihadi organisations. The theoretical background provided in this section is radicalisation theory, feminist approaches and gendering, including previous research on women in political violence.

Radicalisation process

As Ranstorp (2010:6) points out, it is very complex to try and understand the radicalisation process. The radicalisation occurs under the influence of different push and pull factors. Push factors alienate a person from the current society while pull factors are attract a person to political extremism. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:33) The push and pull factors are risk factors that might increase the likelihood of radicalisation, but they do not lead to radicalisation per se. (Säpo 2010:29) Sageman (2004:135) describes them as factors that are necessary, but not the sole explanation to why people become radicalised.

The radicalisation process is highly individualised, why it is so hard to map a common radicalisation process for several individuals. Push and pull factors involve a wide combination of socio-psychological factors. (Ranstorp 2010:6) Examples of push factors are discrimination, marginalisation and low self-esteem, and examples of pull factors are sense of power or control, security and respect. (Säpo 2010:29) To map the push and pull factors is useful to understand how people gain more acceptances for political violence. Furthermore, as Gentry and Sjoberg (2015:33) points out, the framework is also of good use to "*reflect and reify gendered assumptions*".

As pointed out before, the radicalisation process is highly individualised. Trying to generalise some common attributes of radicalised individuals, the Swedish Security Police have mapped four different pathways to radicalisation, together with the National Council of Crime Prevention. These are; 1) the delinquent´s route, 2) the brooder´s route, 3) the family´s route, and 4) the contact seeker´s route. (Säpo 2010:37) These can also be described as different personality types for individuals who become radicalised.

The delinquent usually has a criminal past, and a history of domestic violence and drugs is not uncommon. They radicalise for the excitement of violence, as they usually have a history of using violence to solve problems. The brooder's route is characterised by searching, as they usually feel misfit in their social context. They usually had a safe childhood, but might have experienced bullying and loneliness. They often radicalise through literature, and therefore self-radicalisation is not uncommon. The one who radicalises through family does not radicalise to fit in, in the society, like the two former, but rather by accepting the radical notions in their immediate surroundings. They grew up in a radical environment, and therefore, the radicalisation comes as a natural part of life. The contact seekers are, as the name suggests, radicalised through seeking contact with a specific individual or group. In contrast to the family route, they are not brought up with radical ideas, and in contrast to the brooder and the delinquent, they do not necessarily feel they do not belong in the society in general. What is appealing for the contact seeker is merely closeness and belonging, and they are not necessarily drawn to the extremist group because of the group's ideology. (Säpo 2010:37-39)

Even though self-radicalisation has gained more attention in today's debate[9], both professionally and academically, it seems that physical contact is still of great importance to individuals who are radicalised. However important Internet and social media have been in recruitment, one has to remember that social contact is still of great importance for people who are radicalised. (Hellmich 2010:81) Thus, we can assume that most Swedes who have travelled abroad to join a violent jihadi organisation have been in contact with radicals, not only over the Internet.

Feminist approach and gendering

As mentioned above, there are two traditional sexes, men and women. Thus, male and female have traditionally been portrayed as opposites. As Gentry and Sjoberg (2015:22) puts it "*What man is (or supposed to be) women cannot be, and what women is (or supposed to be) man cannot be*." By recognising that gender is socially constructed, and thus not absolute, we can study the way masculinity and femininity is portrayed. The fact that gender is socially constructed does not make it less real, as Gentry and Sjoberg points out (2007:6). However, with this in mind we can deconstruct the traditional gender norms when studying people's participation in political violence. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:25)

In the study of International Relations, feminists have focused on three things. That is, to look for women and their role in international relations, to see what gender characteristics are evident on basis of perceived membership in sex groups (of individuals as well as states and non-state actors) and gendering; the application of those perceived gender norms. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:24) Gendering is a process between actors, where

---

[9] This shift has been evident in the Scandinavian context since Breivik conducted his attacks in Oslo and Utøja 2011.

traditional gender norms is prescribed and maintained. (Sjoberg 2013:46) Gentry and Sjoberg argues that violent people, no matter men or women, live in a gendered world. Thus, women are perceived as non-violent even though history shows that women have always been, and always will be, engaged in violence. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:2)

Violent extremism, radicalisation and terrorism have often been characterised as male issues, and the question of females in political violence have been undermined and characterised by bias and misconceptions. Since women have been portrayed as peaceful and non-violent, women has been seen as passive and helpless victims in conflict situations. Thus, the idea that a female can be active in political violence have been ignored, and not studied enough. By maintaining gender norms, it has been assumed that women are not involved in political violence. This assumption, together with the lack of women in decision making and law enforcement, has shaped counter-terrorism. (OSCE 2013: 3-5) As Bloom (2011:231) further argues:

> "Only a handful of countries have taken into consideration the danger posed by female terrorists. Even agencies that should know better are surprised and unprepared for the threat women pose. The common assumption that women are inherently nonviolent remains fixed in people's minds. Even when women are implicated in violence, there is a tendency to assume that they are merely the pawns of men."

Women's violence is often discussed in terms of the traditional female norms. Thus, violent women are not only seen as bad people, but also as bad women, failing to live up to norms of femininity and what a women is supposed to be like, that is passive and peaceful. Thus, they have failed as members of society and as women. Because of female subordination in global politics, women's violence have been hidden or ignored. However, women, like men, are capable of violence and they commit acts of violence for a variety of different reasons. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:3)

Gentry and Sjoberg have found that women who engage in political violence are often portrayed as mothers, monsters or whores. Each narrative is based on gendered assumptions about what is appropriate female behaviour. Mothers, who are fulfilling their biological destinies and sometimes act violent to revenge the death of a husband or a son. Thus, their acts of violence are a need to belong and nurture family. The monster narrative eliminates rational behaviour. Since violence does not fit the female narrative, the monster is not acting rational, so she is described as insane and in denial of her femininity. Thus, she is no longer human. Those women who are described as whores are perceived to act on their sexual dependence and depravity. The use of violence is merely an act of desperation, brought by the inability to please men sexually or it is a way of getting men's attention. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:12)

Even though violent men are often described as rational actors, very few researches have said the same about women in political violence. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2015:13) Women are perceived as emotional, and thus not acting rationally. Åhäll (2012:182) further argues that females have been associated with a so-called life-giving identity, rather that a life-taking identity. Thus, women are refused agency in political violence and the essential understandings of gender are reinforced.

With the traditional gender norms, describing women as passive and peaceful, it has been assumed that women could never choose to participate in political violence. Thus, as Bloom (2011) argues, the underlying assumption is that their actions are dependent on the influence of a man. She further argues that people have presented far too simplistic theories on why women engage in political violence, and that there are needs to work past these gender stereotypes in order to properly understand what drives them. Thus, Bloom

presents four R's, revenge redemption, relationship and respect. She claims that women who engage in political violence is motivated by either of these. They act upon revenge for deaths in their families or friends, or redemption for old sins. According to Bloom there has also been reports on recruits who is "*literally seducing them into joining the group and then involving them in suicide operations*". Thus, she would be active because of a romantic relationship. Lastly, women may join to gain respect from their community. (Bloom 2011:xi, 235-236)

These four R's resemble Richardson's three R's: revenge, renown and reaction. Richardson claims these are the reasons that seem underlying for people who become active in terrorist organisation, regardless of their gender.[10] (Richardson 2006:83-89) Bloom also argues that her four factors may apply equally to men. Since this is the case, it seems it is not necessary to distinguish female political violence from men's political violence. However, she claims that men are freer, since they can go to university and travel abroad if they wish. Thus, females, who more rarely have the opportunity to aspire a carrier, would be more prone to political violence, to gain a sense of purpose. This theory is in line that social depravation is the causal factor for political violence. It may be important for some, but it has been shown that poverty is not necessary for radicalisation. Bloom further argues for a fourth R on the list, that is rape. During recent years, for example in Iraq and Chechnya, rape has been used to coerce women to participate in combat. (Bloom 2011:236) Femicide, the use of rape as means in conflict, seems to have increased during recent years, or at least the awareness of it has increased. However, this is not something that has been reported as a reason for radicalisation to

---

[10] Richardson does not point out that these three R's is the same regardless of gender, however she does not bring it up for discussion, and thus it should be applicable to all individuals in political violence.

violent jihadi organisations in Europe, and thus it will not be discussed further in this dissertation.[11]

---

[11] There have been media reports on sexual violence and trafficking conducted within ISIS-controlled territory, mainly on non-muslims. We do not know for sure what the situation for European women in the area looks like, which will be discussed in the next section. However, we can assume they are not sold, like reports tell us about non-muslim girls, and therefore the question of femicide will be left out from this dissertation.

Jihadists and jihadi brides

In the following section we will briefly present the historical background of violent jihadi organisations as well as the research conducted so far on European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory. The background is a necessity to follow the analysis and to objectively look at Swedish counter radicalisation.

Violent jihadi organisations

The revival of Islam in the Middle East was the starting point for today's violent jihad. The defeat of the combined forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the six-day Arab-Israeli war in 1967 has been described as the start of this revival of Islam. The war was considered a great defeat for the Muslim world, thus some questioned what had gone wrong with Islam, and how to turn it around. (Esposito 2002:8) Some argued it was the Western influences in form of secularism and nationalism that had led to their defeat, and their undermined position globally. Thus, by going back to the traditional Islam they could once again be superior.

During the 1970s, the Islamic opposition and reform movements started to gain influence in the Middle East and North Africa. This was, among other things, evident through the Iranian revolution in 1979, which served as an inspiration for several activists in the Middle East at the time. During the same year, 1979, the Grand Mosque in Mecca was seizure by militants, who claimed the Saudi regime were infidels, and they called for a purification of Islam and an end to Western influences. In later years, Bin Laden was very much influenced by the activism during the 1970s, as his ideology follows theirs in a hope for a return to traditional Islam. (Esposito 2002:8-9)

While violent jihadi organisations started on a local level, the Soviet-Afghan war marked a change as jihad went global. Muslims from all over the world gathered to support the mujahidins. (Esposito 2002:257) Al Qaeda and ISIS follows this trend of global jihad, as they engage Muslims from all over the world for their cause.

According to Esposito, terrorists such as bin Laden reject rules of war within the Islamic traditions, so-called just jihad. They do not recognise any limits, but employ new weapons and means, as well as civilians. According to Islamic law and just jihad, the violence used has to be in proportion, and one should only use the force absolutely necessary for the cause. Civilians should never be targeted and it is the head of state or the ruler that has the authority to declare jihad. Individuals and groups who are convinced by the ideologies of Al Qaeda and other militant groups ignore these rules and take the liberty of declaring holy war, or as Esposito call them, "*unholy war in the name of Islam*". (Esposito 2002:257)

In 1998, the formation of the World Islamic Front of the Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders was announced by bin Laden. This was an umbrella organisation, or a network, of radicals. With this announcement bin Laden also issued a fatwa where he stated that all Muslims should do their best to kill US citizens and their allies, this was described as the duty for all Muslims. The worldview of bin Laden was that all Muslims were under occupation in a world dominated by militant Christianity and Judaism. Thus, all true Muslims had an obligation to call for global jihad against these historic enemies of Islam. He prescribed a clash of civilisations, between the Muslim world and the Western world, or the Judeo-Christian world. Since Muslims were under occupation of the latter, their jihad was defensive, not offensive. (Esposito 2002:257) The idea of bin Laden, and other violent jihadists, is very much in line with Huntington's theory of the "clash of

civilisation" from 1993. In it, he foresees a war between Islam and the Judeo-Christian world. According to violent jihadists, this war is on going at the moment, and it has been since the defeat in the six-day war.

Because of Westerns abuse, bin Laden claims that the entire world has been divided "*into two regions – one of faith where there is no hypocrisy and another of infidelity, from which we hope God will protect us*."[12] An outrage against America because they, as an infidel, non-Muslim government, have occupied sacred territory was in the centre of bin Laden's ideology and his declaration of war against the US. He claimed that the US controlled Mecca and Medina through their cooperation and close relationship with Saudi Arabia. (Esposito 2002:21-22) The goal of the violent jihadi organisations is to re-establish past Muslim glory, to defeat the Western powers and the re-establishment of a true Islamic state.[13]

The attacks of 9/11 made the West very aware of the threat violent jihadi organisations could pose. However, it was only after the Madrid attack in March 2004 and the London attacks in July 2005 that European authorities came to realise that terrorism was home-grown, and no longer a foreign phenomenon. (Ranstorp 2010:1) However, recruitment for jihad is not a new phenomenon in Europe, as European jihad fighters were recruited earlier for wars in Afghanistan and Bosnia (Korteweg et al 2010:34) and in the 1990s many were active in the GIA (the Armed Islamic group) who's means was to establish an Islamic state in Algeria. Many of its followers were based in France, however there were

---

[12] From bin Laden's warning, quotation from Esposito 2002 who refers to full text from BBC.

[13] This is a general description of those under the Al Qaeda umbrella. There is, naturally, geografical differences in the end goal, for example Hamas who wants to establish a Palestinian state with Muslim rule, not including other Muslim countries.

people engaged in the movement in Sweden as well. (Sandelin 2012:242) More recently many Swede's have travelled to join al Shabab, military training with Al Qaeda and now, ISIS. The latter differs from previous recruitments, because they also specify in recruitments for women.

The Islamic state is a branch from Al Qaeda, historically. It is a merge between the so called Islamic State of Iraq and the movement al Nusra. As they merged on April 9, 2013, they adopted the name the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIS. (Stern & Berger 2015:40) Not long thereafter, on February 2, 2014, al Qaeda disavowed ISIS in a written statement: "*ISIS is not a branch of the [al Qaeda] group, we have no organisational relationship with it, and [al Qaeda] is ot responsible for its actions*." (Zelin 2014) One main difference between al Qaeda and ISIS is that the former does not have the aspiration to take power. Their organisation, ideology and strategy is based on an idealised future, which is not expected to be fulfilled within the near future. The two movements are sharing the same ideology regarding the perceived Western abuse of the Ummah and the will to establish a traditional Islamic state. However, ISIS rejects al Qaeda's passive model, and see no reason to wait, and seek to idealise their future Utopia here and now. ISIS model has proven very successful in order to recruit foreign fighter. (Stern & Berger 2015:194) Being in line with Al Qaeda's ideas have probably been helpful for them to get new recruits. Also, since it is the one violent jihadi group that has gotten so far as in declaring a state – they need citizens. Since they traditionally believe that women should not fight they have not been focused on female recruits before, at least not from abroad. Now they are establishing a state, and they need all people they can get, fighting or not.

Women's role

In the Muslim community, Muslim family has been regarded with high importance. Thus, women have played a crucial role in the upbringing and education of children, and taking care of the domestic work. In many Muslim countries, patriarchy remains the standard, partly legitimised by religion. Lately, women in these countries have progressively challenged the traditional patriarchy and its structures, also legitimised partly by religion. Female reformers does not reject the religious traditions, but rather they embrace it and claims later generations have forgotten the true meaning of Islam. Due to recent activism, women's opportunities both outside and inside the household have expanded in Muslim countries to this day. (Esposito 2002:131-133) One such opportunity may be the opportunity to use violence.

There are several examples of women who uses violence as their means in jihadi organisations before. For example female suicide bombers in the Palestinian territories and Chechnya, whose motives have also been subordinated as Gentry and Sjoberg (2007:88-140) argues. In the case of Chechnya, it is usually assumed that those women acted to revenge the death of husbands and sons. Thus, this description would fall into the mother narrative. Describing these female terrorists as mothers leaves out the stories of humanisation that these women have experienced in the conflict, according to Gentry and Sjoberg. As they further point out, all Chechens have experienced conflict and all the misfortunes that come with it. (Gentry & Sjoberg 2007:88, 99, 101)

In the case of Palestine, female suicide bombers started to become active during the second intifada. This has also been dismissed as radicalisation for men's attention etcetera, and also for a feminist fight. Scholars have argued that the reason why Palestinian women commit suicide attacks is to be equal to men, thus it would be part of a

25

feminist movement. However, women in Palestine who have been active have been part of violent jihadi organisations, such as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and thus they have conservative views of gender roles. The female suicide bomber Ayat Akhras, who implemented an attack in March 2002 also emphasised traditional gender norms in her farewell statement. In it, she accused the neighbouring countries of Palestine for preferring to watch women fight than doing something themselves. (Brunner 2005:30, 33, 42) As shown, Akhras was also shaped by traditional gender norms and had no intention of changing them. Thus, her act of violence was not part of a feminist struggle towards female oppression. It was part of the greater battle for the freedom of Palestine, just like for her male counterparts. The idea of women in violence, but still a will to maintain traditional gender norms is similar in Palestine to today's European women in ISIS-controlled territory. They emphasis the need for women to have an important domestic role, and that they should not engage in violence, however this alongside strong support for violence conducted by the Islamic State.

Swedish counter radicalisation

According to Ranstorp et al (2015:8) the main focus for counter radicalisation in Sweden has been on right wing extremists, and not so much on militant jihadists. For example, there is a well-developed program for people who choose to leave right wing groups called Exit at Fryshuset in Stockholm. The same organisation started a phone line for friends and families of jihadi foreign fighters during the summer of 2014. However, it was only open until the end of 2014 due to lack of resources. (Ranstorp et al 2015:58)

The Security Police have mapped out three different types of extremism that is present in Sweden, which are autonomous, white power and jihadi movements. In the Security Police annual reports from 2013(:31) and 2014(:32), the jihadi movement is portrayed as

the most urgent terrorist threat. Earlier this movement was not defined as a threat towards Sweden's security, it was mostly mentioned in the context of financial support for organisations.

Traditionally, counter radicalisation and counter terrorism has been an assignment for the Police and the Security Police. However, the prior government in power[14] emphasised the importance of a functioning democracy and strong democratic values to counter radicalisation. Thus, the civil society gained more responsibility in counter radicalisation and is now working with people at risk.

The threat from extremist groups has mainly been seen as an external threat to Sweden, and thus it has primarily been a question for the Police. However, since the 1990s violent extremist groups have been defined as a threat towards democracy, and thus it has gained attention from a range of groups in society to counter it. (Regeringskansliet 2011:5) In a government report from 2011 regarding counter radicalisation, it is claimed that: "*a well functioning democracy is the primary protection against extremism*"[15]. (Regeringskansliet 2011:18) This focus on democracy gave a lot of organisations in the civil society responsibility of counter radicalisation, in the form of education and social support.

Europeans who travel

Since late 2012, Western countries have been confronted with the issue of a growing number of their citizens travelling to Syria to join the fight against the regime of al Assad

---

[14] Center-right government in power from 2006-2014.

[15] My translation. Original text: "En väl fungerande demokrati är det främsta skyddet mot extremism."

in the civil war. Most of them have joined jihadist groups such as Jabhat al Nusra, the al Qaeda affiliate, or the Islamic State. (Bekker & de Leede 2015)

The number of Western migrants to ISIS controlled territory overall is estimated at 3000, out of these the number of women is estimated at 550 persons. There are more men than women who have travelled from Europe to ISIS-controlled territory (Hoyle et al 2015:8, 37). However, the Islamic State has focused on female recruits, in contrast to other violent jihadi organisation, for example Al-Shabab and Al Qaeda. The Swedish Security Police have officially confirmed that at least 150 persons have left Sweden to join Jihadi-groups, however they claim that the number is likely to exceed 300. Of the 150 cases that have been officially confirmed 30-40 are women. (E-mail correspondence Säpo 2015-07) Even though the numbers show that a large number of women are active in violent Jihadi organisations, the authorities and media are sometimes portraying these women as harmless and often not responsible for their own actions.

Korteweg et al (2010) presents an internal and an external dimension to the radicalisation process for Muslims in Europe, not gender specific. The internal dimension are described as a lack of debate within the Islamic community regarding for example interpretations of holy texts, which gives extremists the opportunity to spread their interpretations without counterarguments. The polarisation of Muslim communities and a perceived lack of belonging in the Western society is one further factor that Korteweg el al argues gives further incentment for radicalisation. The general socio-economic lag of Muslim immigrant populations, and their generally low level of integration in European society at large, contributes to the search by Muslim youth for new means of development and progress. High levels of unemployment, and a perceived sense of lack of opportunities makes youth feel less belonging, and thus it can contribute to radicalisation. However, as

mentioned above, social deprivation is not the reasons for radicalisation. It can, however, increase the sense of discrimination, towards themselves or to their perceived social group, which can lead to a sense of dissatisfaction for the current social structure. Among the jihadists there is a discourse of glorification of the jihad and martyrdom, which has made Muslim youths, who are trapped in a cycle of discrimination, stigmatization and criminalization, susceptible to recruitment efforts. (Korteweg et al 2010:31-32)

Korteweg et al describes the external dimensions of radicalisation as the perceived injustice suffered by Muslims, not in Europe but in conflict areas such as Chechnya, Iraq and Palestine. There is a perception that Western policy in Muslim countries accually have neo-imperialist and colonial implications. Thus, Military interventions by Western states contribute to radicalisation of Muslims in Europe. The perception of injustice is also reinforced by the flow of development aid to regimes in the Middle East that are defined as corrupt or authoritarian by radicals. (Korteweg et al 2010:33) Hoyle et al (2015:10-14) also point out that, it seems that one of the main triggers for both men and women is the perceived oppression of the Muslim world, the Ummah, conducted by the West. Besides these perceived grievances, the media and Internet also play an important role in shaping perceptions among young Muslims regarding the situation in the Middle East and the Western interventions. (Korteweg et al 2010:33) However important the Internet is for radicalisation, for joining violent jihadi groups abroad the actual encounter with a formal member is crucial according to Hellmich (2010:81).

European women's radicalisation process

Schröter (2015) points out that many researches have claimed that women's reason for joining violent jihadi organisation is a romantic idea. However, she argues this is a reductionist point of view. She states that women who have travelled to ISIS may have

been partly attracted by romance, however, they primarily view themselves as part of the grand movement of establishing a new Caliphate. (Schröter 2015) Saltman and Smith (2015:5) agrees, and also claims that it is way too simplistic to argue that the women from Europe who travel to join jihadist movements solely do so to find love:

> "The assumption that females join ISIS primarily to become "jihadi brides" is reductionist and above all, incorrect. Reasons for females travelling are multi-causal and include a broad range push and pull factors, different in their influential weight for each case."

Saltman and Smith (2015) have identified three push factors as well as three pull factors that encourage women from Europe to migrate to ISIS-controlled territory. The push factors are similar as for their male counterpart. These are:

> "feeling isolated socially and culturally within a Western culture, feeling that the international Muslim community as a whole is being violently persecuted, and frustration over the perceived lack of international action in response to this persecution." (Saltman & Smith 2015:9)

The pull factors also have major similarities with those for the men traveling to ISIS-controlled territory, even though it seems that the recruitment strategies vary: However, due to different roles for men and women in ISIS-controlled territory, it seems that the narratives of the pull factors differ in recruitment material. The pull factors are: *"idealistic goals of religious duty and building a utopian Caliphate state, belonging and sisterhood, and romanticising of the experience."* (Saltman & Smith 2015:13) Thus, these push and pull factors are similar to what Kortweg et al emphasised (2010) as external and internal factors.

In contract to other violent jihadi organisation, ISIS has recruitment material especially focused on female recruits. For example, manifestos aimed towards women has been written and there has been sections in their online publication "Dabiq" that is especially

aimed at women who symphatise with ISIS, and women in ISIS-controlled territory are involved with recruitment over social media. (Saltman & Smith 2015:18)

We cannot surely know the role women play once they have joined a violent jihadi organisation, most current ISIS. It seems they do not travel to fight, but to build up the Caliphate state in other ways. It is not certainly known that women are not fighting, and it is recognised that some women have a very important role in the public sphere. The all-female Al-Khanssaa Brigade published a manifesto in February this year where they talk about the role of women in the Islamic State. In it, they clearly state that women's primary role is in the household. However, women are allowed to leave the house under three conditions, one of them being jihad;

> "if it has been ruled by fatwa that she must fight, engage in jihad because the situation of the ummah has become desperate, as the women of Iraq and Chechnya did, with great sadness". (Al-Khanssaa 2015:22)

Thus, the ideal women should stay in the house but if necessary she can fight. The Al-Khanssaa brigade is all female, and among other things they work as moral police officers. Thus, there are women who are needed in the public sphere and they are also important to build the state, and to recruit other women.

Even though women are encouraged to stick with traditional gender norms, there are some posts on social media that reveals a willingness to fight for ISIS. One woman, who goes by the name Umm Ubaydah tweeted: "*I wonder if I can pull a Mulan and enter the battle field*". (Hoyle et al 2015:5) Her origin is not specified, as she does not want to share it on twitter, she has only confirmed that she is from Northern Europe. (Zavadski 2014) Thus, she may possibly be from Sweden.

European women in ISIS territory

It seems that the life for European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory is mainly a domestic one and women seem occupied with household work, according to Hoyle et al (2015). For example, Umm Ubaydah, previously referred to, wrote explicitly on her twitter that "*the best thing for a women is to be a righteous wife and to raise righteous children.*" The women's everyday lives are filled with household tasks. Hoyle et al points out that, among the household tasks, it seems like cooking is the most important one, since they often post pictures of food on social media. Besides the domestic life and household tasks, women spend time reading and studying Arabic and Religion. Thus, women are primarily in the house, and movements outside the household are restricted. (Hoyle et al 2015:22-23)

The fact that the women are currently living in a warzone inevitably affects them. Their language, when describing the conflict situation, and especially bomb attacks aimed at their community, can be perceived as both passionate and threatening. Among others brought up in Hoyle et al's analysis, one Dutch women talks about those "*dirty dogs, throwing bombs.*" Another woman tweets: "*Yesterdays blood wasn't enough, the planes are back!! May Allah's durse be upon the oppressors!*" Hoyle et al (2015) claims that such language suggests that the women's experience of bombing raids can further intensify their dislike towards their opponents, and their radicalisation. They further argue that policy makers should be aware of the fact that women who have been in ISIS-controlled territory may become a greater threat when they are in Europe, as they have experienced the violence of a warzone. (Hoyle et al 2015:16)

It is important to understand whether or not these women are willing to fight, when trying to analyse if they might pose a threat towards the West in the future. In order to do so

objectively, one have to look beyond the traditional gender norms. As shown by Hoyle et al's analysis, European women who have joined ISIS do not only celebrate the violence conducted by the group, some of them also express a willingness to fight. There is only a handful of the women who have been subject to Hoyle et al's analysis who would be willing to fight, however all of them support ISIS violence. Furthermore, the same women who describe a desire to conduct violent acts for the cause of the Islamic State also emphasise the importance of women's domestic role, and that women should in fact not be on the battlefield unless highly necessary. (Hoyle et al 2015:31) The two tweets above from Umm Ubaydah is an example of this.

While men who travel to fight in ISIS-controlled territory are usually referred to as Mujahedin (holy warrior), women who are there usually refer to themselves as muhajirat (female migrant). (Salman et al 2015:7) Thus, they often self-identify as migrants and not as warriors. Hence, we can assume most of them are not fighting, albeit they are supporters of the violence.

How women are portrayed

In the following section the Swedish counter radicalisation strategy, and the discourse analysis of the quotations regarding females in violent jihadi organisations will be presented. The materials used to conduct this analysis includes official reports by the government, the Security Police and the Swedish Defence University, as well as information provided by the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism, complemented by media sources. The presentation of this material is twofold. First, I will present the quotations talking generally about the reasons for radicalisation and counter radicalisation, and specifically on push and pull factors, and then present the prescribed role women play in violent jihadi organisation. The most notable example for the latter is the role European women play once they arrive in ISIS-controlled territory.

Reasons for radicalisation and counter radicalisation

As mentioned above the reasons for radicalisation can be divided in two categories, that is; push factors, the things that the individual is neglecting in the current society, and pull factors, things that attract the individual to the extremist group. As described in detail above, Saltman and Smith (2015) have concluded three push factors as well as three pull factors for European women who chose to travel to ISIS-controlled territory.

Even though Saltman and Smith (2015) have concluded that the reasons for radicalisation do not differ between men and women, there are several examples of pinpointing a prescribed difference between men and women's radicalisation process. For example, Ranstorp et al (2015) claims that the radicalisation process looks different for men and

women and that it should be managed with accordingly. However, they do not specify how it differs, and how it should be taken into account in counter radicalisation.[16]

Many of the government documents emphasises the importance of a gender perspective. For example a government report from 2013, concerning work against violent extremism and future objectives, states:

> "In this context we would like to emphasis the importance that those who work preventive have to acknowledge that methods for recruiting and roles in violent extremism may vary for women and men. Violent extremism, like most other violent crimes, is perceived to be an area where men and what is perceived as masculine norms dominates. This is important to acknowledge in the preventive work to reach both women and men who are at risk to get engaged in such criminal activities and be able to prevent it customised to the individual."[17]
>
> (SOU 2013:115-116)

As the above quotation emphasis, the government are aware of the gender norms and that women tend to be dismissed in counter radicalisation actions. This awareness is of great importance, and would imply that Swedish counter radicalisation does not experience any gendering. However, even though the expressed awareness it seems that Swedish counter radicalisation are sometimes falling into traditional gender norms.

---

[16] With further talks with Ranstorp he explained that one of the main differences is grooming. However, he did emphasis that the assumption that girls travel to get married is misleading, and most girls do not even take marriage into consideration before they leave. (Phone conversation 2015-07-08)

[17] My translation. Original text: "Vi vill i sammanhanget betona vikten av att de som arbetar förebyggande är uppmärksamma på att rekryteringssätt och roller inom våldsbejakande extremism kan variera för kvinnor och män. Våldsbejakande extremism, liksom en hel del annan våldsbrottslighet, upplevs vara en verksamhet där männen och det som uppfattas som manliga normer dominerar2. Det här är viktigt att beakta i arbetet med förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism för att nå både kvinnor och män som riskerar att hamna i denna typ av brottslig verksamhet och kunna förebygga det på ett till individen anpassat sätt."

During the summer of 2015 the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism suggested that mothers should have a greater impact in counter radicalisation programmes. This is in line with the previous research as Hoyle et al (2015:17) argue:

> "there is evidence to suggest that women's families have a strong influence in terms of persuading some prospective female migrants at least to delay, if not to reject migration entirely."

However, this excludes the family pathway to radicalisation, one of the Swedish Security Police's four pathways to radicalisation. Fact is both women and men can become radicalised through their families and friends. By claiming that a heavier burden should lie on the mothers in terms of preventing radicalisation, the National Coordinator assume that mothers, in their nature, is pacifists and not supportive of their children's choice to migrate.[18]

Push factors

According to Saltman and Smith, the main push factors for European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory are: feeling isolated socially and culturally in Western society, feeling that the Ummah is being violently persecuted, and frustration over the perceived lack of international action in response to this persecution, as mentioned above. (Saltman & Smith 2015:9)

Increased Islamophobia has been mentioned in Sweden, in debates on violent jihadi organisations, not specifically on women, but on all individuals who are radicalised. The

---

[18] This has proven not to always be the case. For example, in Channel 4 news exclusive "Brittons fighting with Syria's jihadi ´band of brothers", one mujahedin in ISIS-controlled territory speaks of his mother in Great Britain being supportive of his choice to go there: "Al-hamdu lillah, she understands."

government also points to globalisation as a reason for increased sense of insecurity among groups in society. (Regeringskansliet 2011:21) This discussion has not been gender specific.

Even though it has not been mentioned in the context of counter radicalisation, there have been reports on women wearing hijab being attacked in Sweden, both physically and verbally.[19] This should be brought up in the discussion on Islamophobia as a push factor for radicalisation. By addressing this, and not merely the men who are seen as responsible for women's radicalisation, it can enable the addressing of the roots of the problems. The fact remains that women are, as Saltman and Smith points out, driven by the same push factors as men.

In their report on violent jihadi organisations from 2010, the Security Police mentions a list of push factors, other than those mentioned by Saltman and Smith (2015). For example, two of them are low self-esteem and being radicalised under the influence of someone else, admiring a group or a specific person in that group. (Säpo 2010:29) When speaking of women who are engaged in violent jihadi organisation, it has often been claimed they are so because of a man. An example from the same report, presented by the Security Police in 2010 is the following:

> "Most of those who participate in or support violence-promoting Islamist extremism are men, but a small number of women are also represented. An overwhelming majority of the women who are themselves active in violence-promoting Islamist networks in Sweden are wives or ex-wives of men who are active in those circles." (Säpo 2010:57)

---

[19] See for example: SvD (2013-08-23), HelaHälsningland.se (2015-02-25) and SR (2013-08-18).

Thus, it is emphasised that only women who are, or have been in a romantic relationship with a radicalised man are themselves radicalised. Anything else is considered an exception, as it is also described on the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism's website. On the website, the only information regarding women (specifically) in violent jihadi groups is the following:

> "If we look at the gender balance, a majority of the active are men, but there are also women. The vast majority of these women have been radicalised through relations with violence promoting men, but there are exceptions."[20] (Samtalskompassen)

Why is it of importance to pinpoint that women have been radicalised through the relationship of a man? Men who are radicalised are also radicalised through their social environment. However, it is not taken into account that the women in a relationship may be active in the radicalisation process. The phenomenon of self-radicalisation is in fact very uncommon, and most extremists radicalise through their social situation. It can happen through friends, partners or family. The fact that they write "*but there are exceptions*" proves that not all women are radicalised through a man, and the traditional gender norms of men being active and women passive, makes the women in this case look irresponsible for her actions. No one can in detail know what happened in that specific relationship, whether the man or the women was the driving force in the radicalisation process of the two, and therefore it should not be assumed that the men went through the radicalisation process first.

---

[20] My translation. Original text: "Om man ser till könsfördelningen så är majoriteten aktiva män, men det finns också kvinnor. De allra flesta av kvinnorna har radikaliserats genom relationer med våldsbejakande män, men det finns undantag."

In discussing female radicalisation to violent jihadi organisations, the Security Police have further claimed that, since women are radicalised through the relationship with a man, they can be described as contact seekers.

> "Based on known cases, the women who have become radicalised have had, with few exceptions, a relationship with a violence-promoting man and could therefore be characterised as contact-seekers." (Säpo 2010:42)

Thus, the Security Police dismissed the possibility of females being radicalised in any other way, however, females can be delinquents, brooders or radicalised through their families. The framework presented by the Security Police of four pathways to radicalisation is helpful when analysing the radicalisation process. Thus, it should be used for analysing women who become radicalised as well as men. Radicalisation being a very complex and identity specific phenomenon, it is highly reductionist to assume that all women are contact-seekers.

The push factors that Saltman and Smith (2015) mentions can be summed up in lack of belonging in Western culture, and an assumption that the Ummah is being under attack and the radicalised individual have to try and stop those attacks. These three factors have been brought up in counter radicalisation as possible push factors, when speaking of this it has not been something gender specific, merely talk of individuals who are radicalised. One push factor that Saltman and Smith does not bring up as a reason for radicalisation, that the Security Police mentions as an example is the radicalisation process because of someone other than the radicalised individual, someone the individual admires. This has been brought up as an example of women several times, when women are perceived to be radicalised through the relationship of a man, and the man is perceived as the active part in her radicalisation process and she is merely passive, in line with the traditional gender norms.

Pull factors

As mentioned above, the pull factors for young European women to join violent jihadi movements are idealistic goals of religious duty and building a utopian Caliphate state, belonging and sisterhood, and romanticising of the experience, according to Saltman and Smith. (2015:13)

Fredrik Milder, press secretary at the Security Police has claimed that what drives individuals to get involved in violent jihadi organsiations is about the same for men and women: *"It is a religious duty, they want to do what they can, they want to be there and support the new Caliphate as it takes form"*.[21] (Olsson 2015) Thus, he recognises the push factors that Saltman and Smith have pointed out, and does not undermine womens ideological conviction.

However, romanticising the experience has been overemphasised in the material overall, and it is said that women travel to marry men. Thus, one of the main prescribed push factors was being radicalised through a man and the main pull factor is said to be finding a man. See for example the annual report from the Security Police from 2014:

> "It is mostly men between the ages 18-30 that travels to Syria and Iraq. The Security Police have noticed that even women travel abroad to get married to someone who is fighting or to support the struggle in Syria."[22] (Säpo 2014:56)

---

[21] My translation. Original text: "Det är en religiös övertygelse, man vill göra en insats, man vill vara med och stötta när det här kalifatet bildas."

[22] My translation. Original text: "Det är framförallt män i åldrarna 18-30 som reser till Syrien och Irak. Säkerhetspolisen ser även att kvinnor reser utomlands för att gifta sig med någon bland de stridande eller för att logistiskt stödja kampen I Syrien. (Säpo 2010:56) The same quotation can be found in the Government report "Straffrättsliga åtgärder mot terrorismresor" SOU 2015:53.

A further example of the above is the statement by Janovski, who works on counter radicalisation in the municipality of Angered[23], who claims that the motive for young women to leave are somewhat different from the motives of young men. He also sustains the idea than women travels to Syria to meet a man. "*I believe a fascination of criminal men, dangerous and thrilling men can be of importance*". He does, however, also pinpoint that:

> "one should not ignore that there is women in this group who are ideologically convinced and enforcing in the mind-set that characterise the people who choose to travel [to Syria and Iraq]".[24] (Olsson 2014)

This citation is taken from the article "*Women are lured to join the Islamic State*" in Göteborgs-posten. So, already in the article's headline the women are described as passive in their radicalisation process. (Olsson 2015) They are claimed to be lured into joining the Islamic state, and thus it is not described as an active and conscious choice from their part.

Even though there is awareness that women join violent jihadi organisations for ideological beliefs and because they believe they can make a difference, the aspiration of finding a husband is overestimated. The role as a wife and mother is also the one they are prescribed once they are active in a violent jihadi organisation, which will be examined further below.

---

[23] One of the bigger suburb in Gothenburg with 60 000 inhabitants.

[24] My translation. Original text: "En fascination av kriminella män, farliga och spännande män tror jag kan finnas med i bilden, men man ska inte bortse att det i gruppen kvinnor finns de som är ideologiskt helt övertygade och även drivande i tänket som präglar de personer som väljer att åka ned."

Prescribed roles in violent jihadi organisations

As mentioned above, the operative manager of the Swedish Security Police have stated that they do not follow up on the women who come back to Sweden after being abroad, having joined a violent Islamism group. The reason for this being, that they are not a threat since they have not gained experience from fighting, he claims.[25] (Örwall Lovén 2014) Conclusively, they do not prioritise women as a security threat, even though women clearly support the violent means used by these groups. Together with the above citation, Fredrik Milder, press secretary for the Security Police also stated: "*We do not see the same risk as with the men who are active in battles and get increased military capabilities*".[26] (Olsson 2015)

In the Security Police's report on violent jihadi organisation from 2010, they further explain why women are not relevant to follow up:

> "Several women affiliated with violence-promoting Islamist circles are also assessed to share
> the violence-promoting ideology, but in most cases do not engage in activities directly linked
> with security-threatening activities." (Säpo 2010:8)

Even though they state that women are not a security threat because they do not engage in violent activities, the following citation is from the same report:

> "Individuals are known to travel from Sweden with the intent of joining violence-promoting
> Islamist groups abroad to take part in training and, in some cases, unlawful acts of violence
> organised by such groups. This makes these individuals a concrete security threat in the
> countries concerned, regardless of whether they themselves engage in unlawful acts of

---

[25] "Their activities are problematic but based on our mission, which is to prevent terrorist crimes in Sweden, we do not follow up [on them]." (Örwall Lovén 2014-09-24)

[26] My translation. Original text: "Vi ser inte samma risker som med männen som deltar i strider och får en ökad militär förmåga."

violence or enable others to do so. Such actions also risk damaging Sweden's international reputation. Sweden is bound by international law to ensure that Swedish nationals or others residing here do not pose a threat to other countries, and that Sweden does not become a base for terrorism." (Säpo 2010:10)

"*Regardless of whether they themselves engage in unlawful acts of violence*", emphasises the possible security threat individuals who do not engage in violent acts themselves pose on Sweden, even though the Security Police claim in the above citation that women do not pose a threat for the exact same reason. In this quotation, they also highlight the importance for the Swedish Security Police to prevent Swedish citizens from committing crimes abroad. If women do not engage in violence, they do not themselves commit those crimes. However, women have proven to be an important asset for ISIS and other violent jihadi organisations, thus they are "*enabling others to do so*". By ignoring the women who travel abroad to support violent jihadi organisations, or in other ways are funding them from Sweden, the Security Police are not officially taking account of all their responsibilities, this because of the perceived gender roles.

The main role for women in ISIS is prescribed to be a wife and a mother. For example, Brun, active at Kings College, stated in a Swedish news article:

> "*Women has a role in IS that consists of: getting married to a jihadi, start a family and get kids. In addition to that there is room for women to work in health care and children's education. Furthermore they are active online to recruit new women to the Caliphate.*"[27]
> (Christiansson 2015)

---

[27] My translation. Original text: "Kvinnor har en roll inom IS som i princip utgörs av att: gifta sig med en jihadist, bilda familj och skaffa barn. Utöver det finns utrymme för kvinnor att arbeta inom vård och utbildning av barn. Dessutom är de aktiva på nätet och rekryterar nya kvinnor till kalifatet."

In the above quotation, getting married is mentioned as the first thing European women do as they arrive in ISIS-controlled territory. Fredrik Milder, press secretary at the security police says something similar, however he excludes marriage from the description:

> "*Women travel to Syria and Iraq to join violent Islamism extremism movement, that is true. The purpose is to assist with logistics and moral activity: health care, food and marriage to people who are there.*"[28] (Olsson 2015)

According to Hoyle el al (2015:22-23) not all women get married, however, it is easier to move outside of the household when you have a husband. Therefore it may be appealing. They further state that, most women in ISIS-controlled territory are spending most of their time in the household, and thus they are not fighters per se. Therefore the above descriptions seem accurate to reality. However, one should not undermine the fact that some women have shown interest in using violence.

Research has shown that we cannot be certain of what role women play in ISIS-controlled territory. If we look at the Swedish discourse they are prescribed as mothers, wifes, working in health care or education and recruiting other women through online tools. They are not engaged in violence or violent activities, which is also why the Security Police have not defined them as a security threat. However, we have seen examples of violence promoting from women who are in ISIS-controlled territory and a will to engage in violence. Therefore, we cannot rule out that women are also trained and are also engaging in violent activities.

---

[28] My translation. Original text: Kvinnor reser till Syrien och Irak för att ansluta sig till våldsbejakande islamistiska extremistmiljöer, absolut är det så. Syftet är att bistå med logistisk och moralisk verksamhet: sjukvård, mat och även giftermål med personer som är där, säger Fredrik Milder, pressekreterare vid säkerhetspolisen.

Conclusion

This dissertation argues that there is evidence of gendering in Swedish counter radicalisation, and this may cause responsible authorities to miss potential threats in the future. In order to counter radicalisation effectively it is of great essence to understand the radicalisation process. Thus, by recognising women's radicalisation process as it has been verified by Saltman and Smith (2015), counter radicalisation programmes can be more effective.

Included in the introduction was the following quotation: "Their activities are problematic but based on our mission, which is to prevent terrorist crimes in Sweden, we do not follow up [on them]"[29] by Anders Kassman, operative manager of the Swedish Security Police. (Örwall Lovén 2014) This statement is problematic, because it shows that the Swedish Security Police is gendering individuals in violent jihadi organisations. Further prof for this has been discovered in the Security Police's annual reports as well as their report that is specifically concerning violent jihadi organisations in Sweden. This discourse analysis have examined the executives, the Security Police and social workers on the ground, the legislators, the government, and the experts, the Defence University as well as the National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism. The results show that gendering exists to some extent in all of them, thus Swedish counter radicalisation is maintaining traditional gender norms.

According to Saltman and Smith (2015:9), the main push factors for European women who travel to ISIS-controlled territory are: feeling isolated socially and culturally in

---

[29] My translation. Original text: "Deras aktiviteter är problematiska men utifrån vårt uppdrag, vilket är att hindra terrorbrott i Sverige, så gör vi ingen uppföljning."

Western society, feeling that the Ummah is being violently persecuted, and frustration over the perceived lack of international action in response to this persecution, as mentioned above. These factors are discussed in the context of Swede's who radicalises and join violent jihadi movements. However, in the material there was a clear tendency to assert that the main push factors for women were men. For example, when the Security Police claimed that women who join violent jihadi movements are contact-seekers, and thus generalise, and assume the same is true for all females.

As mentioned above, the Swedish Security Police have developed a framework of four pathways to radicalisation; 1) the delinquent´s route, 2) the brooder´s route, 3) the family´s route, and 4) the contact seeker´s route. (Säpo 2010:37) These pathways serve as a good framework to map radicalisation processes. However, when it is stated in the Security Police's report on violent jihadist organisations from 2010 that all women engaged in the former organisation is contact-seeker, that frame-work is excessive. Not only does this hamper counter radicalisation, it can also result in missing an actual attack conducted by females. By not maintaining traditional norms and looking at each radicalisation process objectively, counter radicalisation can become more effective. Therefore, it is of great essence that the counter radicalisation strategies in Sweden is objective, and does not maintain traditional gender norms.

There is also three pull factors for young European women to join violent jihadi movements according to Salman and Smith, those are idealistic goals of religious duty and building a utopian Caliphate state, belonging and sisterhood, and romanticising of the experience, according to Saltman and Smith. (2015:13) Just like in the case of push factors, the material maintain that the pull factors for women who engage in violent jihadi organisation do so because of a man. Regarding pull-factors, romanticising the

experience is slightly overemphasised. One example of this would be Janovski statement in Göteborgs-posten, where he claims that is probably is the fascination of criminal men that lures females to join violent jihadi organisations.

Since this is the situation is Sweden, and as stated before; Scandinavia is often regarded more gender aware than most countries within Europe, we can assume the same is true for other countries. However, it must be emphasised that many of the document had a gender discussion and it seems that the discussion is changing right now. However, even though a gender discussion is constantly on-going, it seems easy to fall into traditional gender norms and assume that females are harmless and passive.

The phenomenon of European women who travel abroad to join violent jihadi groups is a fairly new one. Therefore, it has not been in focus for the authorities working with counter radicalisation and it has not been present in a lot of previous research. However, today it actually is a phenomenon that has to be taken into account. Recent studies conducted by Hoyle et al (2015) and Saltman and Smith (2015), shows that women are radicalised for the same reason as men, and European women in ISIS-controlled territory are supportive of the violence conducted by ISIS.

Further research on the subject is encouraged, research that looks beyond the traditional gender norms and does not immediately assume that women who are active in violent jihadi organisations are passive. Their choice to join an organisation, or travel abroad, is just as cautious as for men, even though traditional gender norms suggests that women are passive and pacifists, thus not violent in their nature. As Gentry and Sjoberg points out (2007 & 2015) women who are active in political violence are viewed as an exception

to femininity. Thus, people seek explanations for their violent behaviour, explanations that suit in the traditional gender norms.

In order to develop more effective counter radicalisation programmes I argue it should be based on individuals and not perceived gender groups. The fact that relevant agents on several places have stated that women in violent jihadi organisations do not pose a threat because they lack military training is highly remarkable. A subjective counter radicalisation, that maintains gender norms, may not be effective enough to hinder future radicalisation processes, or future acts of terrorism. Thus, it is of high importance that we look further than the traditional gender norms.

Bibliography

Åhäll, Linda & Laura J. Shephed, eds. (2012) *Gender, agency and political violence*. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill.

Åhäll, Linda & Thomas Gregory, eds. (2015). *Emotions, politics and war*. Routledge, Oxon.

Alison, Miranda (2004). "Women as Agents of Political Violence: Gendering Security". *Security Dialogue* 35(4), pp. 447-463.

Al-Khanssaa (2015) "Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade". Translation by Charles Winter. *Quilliam Foundation*. Available at: https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/women-of-the-islamic-state3.pdf (2015-08-30)

Arias, Fernandes (2015-07-17) "Allt fler kvinnor ansluter sig till IS". *Sveriges Radio (SR)*. Available at: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid= 83& artikel=6207746 (2015-08-19).

Baker, Aryn (2014-09-06) "How ISIS is Recruiting Women From Around the World". *Time*. Available at: http://time.com/3276567/how-isis-is-recruiting-women-from-around-the-world/ (2015-08-28)

Bekker, Edwin & Seran de Leede (2015). "European Female Jihadists in Syria: Exploring and Under-Researched Topic". *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, The Hague. Available at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Bakker-de-Leede-European-Female-Jihadists-In-Syria-Exploring-An-Under-Researched-Topic-April2015(1).pdf (2015-08-30).

Borum, Randy (2011). "Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A review of Social Science Theories". *Journal of Strategic Security* 4(4), pp.7-36.

Brunner, Claudia (2005) "Female suicide bombers – Male suicide bombing?: Looking for Gender in reporting the suicide bombings of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict". *Global society* 19:1, pp. 29-48.

Channel 4 (2013) "Brittons fighting with Syria's jihadi ´band of brothers´" News exclusive. Produced by Sasha Joelle Achilli. Available at: http://www.channel4. com/ news/syria-war-rebels-jihadi-ibrahim-al-mazwagi (2015-08-30)

Christiansson, Terese (2015-08-02) "Exclusivt: Kvinnorna som hoppade av IS". *Expressen*. Available at: http://www.expressen.se/geo/terese-cristiansson/exklusivt-kvinnorna-som-hoppade-av-is/ (2015-08-30)

Council of the European Union (2005) "The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy" 14469/3/05. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/ 18.635d23c2141933256ea1af7/1381154797983/eu.pdf (2015-08-30).

Council of the European Union (2014). "Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism" 5643/5/14. Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9956-2014-INIT/en/pdf (2015-08-30).

Elensky, Torbjörn (2015) "Får man ta Gud med sig till Sverige? Religiösa församlingar som bro eller buffert för integrationen". *Timbro, Stockholm*. Available at: http://timbro.se/sites/timbro.se/files/files/reports/far_man_ta_gud_med_sig_till_s verige_final.ed__0.pdf (2015-08-25)

Esposito, John L. (2002) *Unholy war: terror in the name of Islam*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

European Commission (2005) "Terrorist recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization" COM(2005) 313 final. Available at: http://eurlex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0313&from=EN (2015-08-29)

European Commission (2014). "Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU's Response" COM(2013) 941 final. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/crisis-andterrorism/radicalisation/docs/communication_on_preventing_radicalisation_a nd_violence_pr omoting_extremism_201301_en.pdf (2015-08-30).

Gentry, Caron & Laura Sjoberg (2007) *Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women's Violence in Global Politics*. Zed Books: London.

Gentry, Caron & Laura Sjoberg (2008). "Reduced to Bad Sex: Narratives of Violent Women from the Bible to the War on Terror". *International Relations*, 22(1), pp. 5-23.

Gentry, Caron & Laura Sjoberg eds. (2011) *Women, Gender and Terrorism*. University of Georgia Press, Athens GA.

Gentry, Caron & Laura Sjoberg (2015). Beyond mothers, monsters, whores: thinking about women's violence in global politics. Zed books, London.

HelaHälsningland.se (2015-02-25). "Kvinna i slöja attackerades verbalt". Available at: http://www.helahalsingland.se/halsingland/soderhamn/kvinna-i-sloja-attackerades-verbalt (2015-08-30)

Hellmich, Christina (2010) "The psychology of Al-Qaeda: from ideology to participation". Rastorp, Magnus, ed. *Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe*, pp. 68-86. Routledge, London.

Hoyle, Carolyn, Alexandra Bradford & Ross Frenett (2015). "Becoming Mulan?: Female western migrants to ISIS". *Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),* London. Available at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISDJ2969_ Becoming_Mulan_ 01.15_WEB.PDF (2015-08-30).

Huntington, Samuel P. (1993) "The clash of civilizations". Available at: http://www.hks. harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Huntington_Clash.pdf (2015-08-30)

Isakhan, Benjamin (2015). "The Iraq Legacies and the Roots of the 'Islamic State'". In Isakhan, Benjamin (ed.) *The Legacy of Iraq: From the 2003 War to the 'Islamic State'*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Justitiedepartementet (2014) "En nationell samordnare för att värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism" Kommittédirektiv 2014:103. Available at: https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Utredningar/Kommittedirektiv/En-nationell-samordnare-for-at_H2B1103/ (2015-08-30).

Justitiedepartementet (2014) "Våldsbejakande extremism i Sverige – nuläge och tendenser" Ds 2014:4. Available at: http://data.riksdagen.se/fil/842ED766-0A9E-4CAF-8816-92E073D87C51 (2015-08-30)

Korteweg, Rem, Sajjan Gohel, Francois Heisburg, Magnus Ranstorp & Rob de Wijk (2010) "Background contributing factors to terrorism: radicalization and recruitment". Rastorp, Magnus, ed. *Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe*, pp. 21-49. Routledge, London.

Küle, Lene & Lasse Lindekilde (2010). "Radicalization among young Muslims in Aarhus". *Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalisation (CIR)*, Aarhus University, Aarhus. Available at: http://cir.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/radicalization_aarhus_FINAL.pdf (2015-08-25).

Malik, Shiv (2015-02-12) "Lured by ISIS: how the young girls who revel in brutality are offered cause". The Guardian. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/20/push-pull-lure-western-women-isis (2015-08-25)

Milliken, Jennifer (1999). "The study of discourse in International Relations: A critique of research and methods". *SAGE publications* 5(2), pp. 225-254.

Olsson, Daniel (2015-01-21). "Unga kvinnor lockas till Syrien". Göteborgs-posten. Available at: http://www.gp.se/nyheter/reportage/1.2607022-unga-kvinnor-lockas-till-syrien (2015-08-30)

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE (2013). "Women and Terrorist Radicalization: Final Report". Available at: http://polis.osce.org/library /f/4061/3772/OSCE-AUT-RPT-4061-EN-3772.pdf (2015-08-30).

Out, Rob (2013). "CoPPRa : Community policing and prevention of radicalization". *Journal EXIT Deutschland: Zeitschrift für Deradikalierung und democratische Kultur* 2/2013 pp. 69-75. Available at: http://www.coppra.eu/dl/exit.pdf (2015-08-27)

Örwall Lovén, Andreas (2014-08-28) "Unga svenskor ansluter sig till ISIS". *Svenska Dagbladet* (SvD). Available at: http://www.svd.se/unga-svenskor-ansluter-sig-till-is (2015-08-29)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2015-01-19) "Foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria". Available at: http://www.rferl.org/contentinfographics/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html (2015-08-28).

Ranstorp, Magnus, Linus Gustafsson & Peder Hyllengren (2015-02-23). "From the Welfare State to the Caliphate". *Foreign Policy*. Available at: https://foreign policy.com/2015/02/23/from_the_welfare_state_to_the_caliphate_sweden_islami c_state_syria_iraq_foreign_fighters/ (2015-08-30)

Ranstorp, Magnus, ed. (2010) *Understanding violent radicalisation: terrorist and jihadist movements in Europe*. Routledge, London.

Ranstorp, Magnus, Linus Gustafsson & Peder Hyllengren (2015). "Förebyggande av våldsbejakande extremism på lokal nivå: Exempel och lärdomar från Sverige och Europa". *Centrum för Asymmetriska Hot- och TerrorismStudier (CATS),* Försvarshögskolan Stockholm. Available at: http://www.fhs.se/Documents/ Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/F%C3%B6rebyggande%20av %20v%C3%A5ldsbejakande%20extremism%20p%C3%A5%20lokal% 20niv%C3%A5.pdf (2015-08-30).

Ranstorp, Magnus (2015-07-08) Phone conversation.

Reed, Alistair, Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Edwin Bakker (2015). "Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un)Intended Consequences". *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT)*, The Hague. Available at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT- Reed-De-Roy-Van-Zuijdewijn-Bakker-Pathways-Of-Foreign-Fighters-Policy-Options-And-Their-Un-Intended-Consequences-April2015(1).pdf (2015-08-30).

Regeringskansliet (2011) "Handlingsplan för att värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism" (Regeringens skrivelse 2011/12:44). Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/441d6f98b4e340d3a1a975d66c3e81f6/handlingsplan-for-att-varna-demokratin-mot-valdsbejakande-extremism-skr.-20111244 (2015-08-27).

Richardson, Louise (2006) *What Terrorists Want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat*. Random House, New York.

Sageman, Marc (2004) *Understanding terror networks*. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.

Saltman, Erin Marie & Melanie Smith (2015). "Till Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS phenomenon". *Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD),* London. Available at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon.pdf (2015-08-30).

Samtalskompassen. "Vilka lockas till miljön?". National Coordinator Against Violent Extremism (website) Available at: http://samtalskompassen.samordnarenmotextremism.se/valdsbejakande-extremism/valdsbejakande-islamism/vagen-in/ (2015-08-30)

Sandelin, Magnus (2007) *Extremister: En berättelse on politiska våldsverkare i Sverige*. Bokförlaget DN, Stockholm.

Sandelin, Magnus (2012) *Jihad: Svenskarna i de islamistiska terrornätverken*. Reporto, Stockholm.

Schröter, Susanne (2015-02-11). "Between romance and Kalashnikovs - the women of 'Islamic State'". *DW News.* Available at: http://www.dw.com/en/between-romance-and-kalashnikovs-the-women-of-islamic-state/a-18250589 (2015-08-19).

Sjoberg, Laura (2013). *Gendering global conflict: toward a feminist theory of war.* Columbia University Press, New York.

Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU (2012). "Främlingsfienden inom oss" 2012:74. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/59ee0dc5b7dd4411b66e0 c51adcdf75b/framlingsfienden-inom-oss-sou-201274 (2015-08-29).

Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU (2012b). "Hemliga tvångsmedel mot allvarliga brott" 2012:44. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/200e45edd 98b4319b588beb0c49ef294/hemliga-tvangsmedel-mot-allvarliga-brott-hela-dokumentet-sou-201244 (2015-08-29).

Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU (2013). "När vi bryr oss – förslag om samverkan och utbildning för att effektivare förebygga våldsbejakande extremism" 2013:81. Available at: http://data.riksdagen.se/fil/8BBD8F35-C8C0-463F-B0E0-873A1D034891 (2015-08-30)

Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU (2015). "Straffrättsliga åtgärder mot terrorismresor" 2015:63. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/82370b8ce45d49 6babf1316f17c1544d/remisslista-sou-2015-63.pdf (2015-08-29)

Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU (2015) "Datalagring och integritet" 2015:31. Available at: http://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/116590d7d8824 b458b4142fe9f3624f5/datalagring-och-integritet-sou-201531 (2015-08-30)

Statskontoret (2015). "Värna demokratin mot våldsbejakande extremism: Utvärdering av en handlingsplan" 2015:6. Available at: http://www.statskontoret.se/upload /Publikationer/2015/201506.pdf (2015-08-27)

Stern, Jessica & J.M. Berger (2015) *ISIS: The state of terror*. HarpersCollin Publishers, New York.

Sveriges Radio, SR (2013-08-18). "Hon misshandlades för sin slöja". Available at: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2151&artikel=5620151 (2015-08-30).

Svenska Dagbladet, SvD (2013-08-23). "Kvinna i slöja attackerad igen". Available at: http://www.svd.se/kvinna-i-sloja-attackerad-igen (2015-08-30)

Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (2012) "Local initiatives to counter violence-promoting political extremism: a collection of examples". Available at: http://skl.se/download/18.2625f9e6145ac763d07be224/1401096 812446/Local_initiatives_to_counter_violence_SALAR.pdf (2015-08-30).

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2010). "Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden". Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4f0385ee 143058a61a89f3/1392294843261/Reportonviolence-promotingIslamist extremisminSweden.pdf (2015-08-30).

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2010b). Annual Report. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4f0385ee143058a61a89ef/1392294 810922/SwedishSecurityService2010.pdf (2015-08-23)

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2011). Annual Report. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4f0385ee143058a61a89ed/1392294 793949/120928sapo_ar2011_engelsk.pdf (2015-08-23)

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2012). Årsbok. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.635d23c2141933256ea1bea/138115 4798310/Sapoarsbok2012extwebb.pdf (2015-08-23)

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2013). Annual Report. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4f0385ee143058a61a81622/140077 0540371/Sapo2013_ENG_webb.pdf (2015-08-23)

Swedish Security Service, Säpo (2014). Årsbok. Available at: http://www.sakerhetspolisen.se/download/18.4c7cab6d1465fb27b01f1a/1426682 274489/Arsbok2014_webb_slutgiltig.pdf (2015-08-23)

Swedish Security Police, Säpo (2015-07-17 – 21) E-mail correspondence, communication department.

Taarnby, Michael (2005) "Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe. Trends and Perspectives". University of Aarhus, Aarhus. Available at: http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/testimony/58.pdf (2015-08-28)

Vidino, Lorenzo & James Brandon (2012). "Countering Radicalization in Europe". *The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICRS)*, King's College London. Available at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf (2015-08-30).

Veldhuis, Tinka & Jørgen Staun (2009). "Islamist Radicalisation: A root cause model". *Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael*, The Hague. Available at: http://www.dcism.dk/graphics/_IO_indsatsomraader/Religion _og_social_konflikt_og_Mellemosten/Islamist%20Radicalisation.Veldhuis%20a nd%20Staun.pdf (2015-08-30).

World Economic Forum (2014) "The Global Gender Gap Report 2014". Available at: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR14/GGGR_CompleteReport_2014.pdf (2015-08-28)

Zavadski, Katie (2014) "Meet the female recruiters of ISIS". *New York Magazine*. Available at: http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/meet-the-female-recruiters-of-isis.html (2015-08-30).

Zelin, Aaron Y. (2014-02-04) "Al-Qaeda Dicaddiliates with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham". *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. Available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-disaffiliates-with-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham (2015-08-30)